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Abstract 
 
Internet worms are capable of quickly propagating by exploiting vulnerabilities of 
hosts that have access to the Internet.  Once a computer has been infected, the worms 
have access to sensitive information on the computer, and are able to corrupt or 
retransmit this information. This dissertation describes a method of predicting Internet 
instability due to the presence of a worm on the Internet, using data currently 
available from global Internet routers.  The work is based on previous research which 
has indicated a link between the increase in the number of Border Gateway Protocol 
(BGP) routing messages and global Internet instability.   
The type of system used to provide the prediction is known as an autoencoder.  This 
is a specialised type of neural network, which is able to provide a degree of novelty 
for inputs.  The autoencoder is trained to recognise “normal” data, and therefore 
provides a high novelty output for inputs dissimilar to the normal data.  The BGP 
Update routing messages sent between routers were used as the only inputs to the 
autoencoder.  These intra-router messages provide route availability information, and 
inform neighbouring routers of any route changes.  The outputs from the network 
were shown to help provide an early warning mechanism for the presence of a worm.  
An alternative method for detecting instability is a rule-based system, which 
generates alarms if the number of certain BGP routing messages exceeds a pre-
specified threshold.  This project compared the autoencoder to a simple rule-based 
system.  The results showed that the autoencoder provided a better prediction and was 
less complex for a network administrator to configure. 
Although the correlation between the number of BGP Updates and global Internet 
instability has been shown previously, this work presents the first known application 
of a neural network to predict the instability using this correlation.  A system based on 
this strategy has the potential to reduce the damage done by a worm’s propagation and 
payload, by providing an automated means of detection that is faster than that of a 
human. 
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Glossary 
 
Autonomous System A collection of Internet gateways or routers that have the same 
administrative policies and use the same internal routing 
protocol. 
Border Gateway 
Protocol 
The Internet protocol specifying the manner in which 
Autonomous Systems exchange routing information. 
Core Internet Router These are physical routers situated on the backbone of the 
Internet.  Able to transmit large amounts of data. 
Internet Weather The measure of health for the Internet, determined by factors 
such as latency and percentage of packets lost between points 
in the Internet. 
Intrusion Detection 
System 
A system that attempts to recognize attempts to break into a 
computers system by monitoring network packets, system 
files and log files.  These systems try to identify attacks based 
on intruder’s attack patterns, rather than known virus or worm 
signatures which are used by anti-virus software. 
Network Prefix The network prefix was introduced with Classless Inter-
Domain Routing (CIDR), which allows for specifying the 
number of bits that identify the gateway or group of gateways 
in an IP address.  The prefix is the contiguous set of bits at the 
most significant end of the IP address that defines the 
collection of systems.  For example, in the IP address 
192.20.100.00/18, the number 18 refers to the first 18 bits 
being used for the network part of the address, and the 
remainder for the specific host address.  Networking prefixes 
are supported by BGP, and replace the older class A, B and C 
networks. 
Peer A networking unit that works at the same networking protocol 
layer as another device. 
Routing Path The complete collection of hops taken by data between two 
networking hosts. 
Routing Table A table stored by a routing device listing all known network 
xiii 
addresses, as well as information allowing it to transmit data 
to other network devices. 
Scaled Conjugate 
Gradient 
Optimisation 
A supervised learning optimisation technique which uses 
gradient information to find the optimum.  Requires 
significantly less iterations than techniques such as back 
propagation but is computationally more complex. 
1 
1 Introduction 
 
The Internet has grown into a vast structure combining thousands of smaller 
networks [1].  It is estimated that traffic across the Internet doubled approximately 
every year for most of the Internet’s existence, and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future  [2].  According to [3, 4], there were more than 285 million Internet 
hosts in July 2004 and an estimated 605 million users in September 2002.  
Applications such as the web and email are widely used for both business and 
personal use.  Companies such as Amazon.com rely on the Internet for business, with 
any network downtime causing a direct economic impact to the company. 
The current control of the Internet is decentralised, since it is made up of many 
smaller independent networks that link up to exchange information using various 
protocols and standards.  Various routing policies have been used to transmit 
information about routes and data between the various networks in the Internet.  The 
original routing policies were designed to centrally manage and distribute traffic 
between networks.  As the Internet grew, a need arose for companies and institutions 
to manage their own routing policies and procedures and to provide a more scalable 
solution that didn’t rely on a single backbone to transmit data.  For these reasons the 
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) was introduced, which provides a scalable and 
robust means of transmitting routing data in a standard way across the Internet.  BGP 
has the ability to inherently find new routes for traffic when other routes become 
unavailable due to events such as router outages.  This, although providing a high 
level of failover, performs non-optimal path selection for routes [5]. 
The ease of access and widespread use of the Internet has made it open to attacks by 
worms which can be propagated through the Internet [6, 7].  An Internet worm is an 
automated program that uses a network to propagate copies of itself on other host 
computers, by exploiting vulnerabilities of the software running on those hosts.  
Worms are capable of spreading rapidly, such as in the case of the SQL Slammer 
worm which infected approximately 75,000 hosts in under ten minutes [8].  They are 
able to cause damage with their payload, since once a host is infected the program has 
control of the host as well as its information.  Their rapid spread is also often 
uncontrolled, which places a high load on the Internet.  These factors contribute 
towards the economic impact caused by worms, which in the case of the Code-Red 
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worms of 2001 caused approximately $2.6 billion of damage [9].  This damage was 
not caused by a malevolent payload of the worm; instead it was largely from the 
downtime of the Internet as a whole for the period that the worm was most active. 
The high load caused by certain worms has a documented effect in increasing the 
number of BGP Update messages sent between routers [10, 11].  The increase in 
traffic causes BGP sessions between routers to expire since messages are unable to be 
received in time.  Routers then select alternative network paths and inform adjacent 
routers about the new routes, as well as about the loss of the previous route.   
Various measures have been put in place to deal with worms such as easily 
updatable anti-virus software, automated patching of operating systems and intrusion 
detection software.  These preventative countermeasures significantly decrease the 
chance of a computer becoming infected, but it has been seen that worms continue to 
propagate regardless.  For this reason, this project has approached the problem of 
worms from a reactive standpoint, with the goal of automatically detecting the 
presence of a worm faster than humans are currently able to.  The method used in this 
project is an autoencoder [34] with the inputs being the number of BGP Update 
messages received on a router.  This method is preferred to that of monitoring stability 
on hosts at the Internet edge, which provide a localised view on instability. 
The work performed in this study is the first known application of a neural network 
used to predict Internet instability by monitoring BGP routing. 
1.1 Aim 
The overall aim of this project is to predict the presence of worms on the Internet, 
specifically by monitoring data available from Internet routers.  It is hoped that the 
higher load caused by worms propagating will be apparent sooner at the routers rather 
than at the Internet edge.  As an extension of this, the project will test whether a single 
router’s data is sufficient to detect Internet-wide instability.  The study will also test 
the effectiveness of neural networks for providing the prediction. 
1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of the project are: 
· To use the novelty detection of a trained autoencoder to provide an 
indication of the possibility of Internet instability, specifically that of worms. 
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· To determine if novelty detection using an autoencoder is able to predict 
Internet-wide instability sooner than a rule-based system.  In using either an 
autoencoder or a rule-based system it is necessary to set a threshold on the 
level above which it is assumed that there is Internet instability. 
· To determine if using the BGP Update messages alone as input to the 
autoencoder is sufficient to predict instability. 
· To determine if a single router can effectively represent Internet-wide 
instability. 
The practical application for this research is to install an automated advanced 
warning system to allow for earlier detection and reaction to Internet instability and 
worms.  Companies and individuals that are capable of analysing worms and viruses 
could be aware of the presence of a worm earlier, and can create a countermeasure 
sooner.  A forewarning in the case of a worm can save a substantial amount of time, 
money and data.  A network administrator that is aware of the presence of a worm is 
able to take preventative action such as blocking ports or emails that are used by the 
worm, also reducing the damage caused by the worm. 
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2 Literature Survey 
 
2.1 Internet and Routers 
Traffic sent on the Internet backbone during 1994 was approximately 15 terabytes 
per month, and in 2000 reached an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 terabytes per month 
[2].  In order to transmit this information across the Internet it is necessary to send 
data over several hops between routers.  These routers are physical devices which rely 
on routing policies and procedures to know where to forward traffic to, and vary 
considerably in their physical location and the rules imposed by the network 
administrators.  Various routing policies are used within local networks, but the 
current standard for intra-network routing is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), 
which utilises the TCP protocol for transmitting information between routers.  
This section forms the basis for subsequent explanations of the effect that worms 
have on the Internet, by providing an overview of the Internet and routing principles.  
This if followed by a more detailed description of the BGP protocol, detailing the 
specific BGP messages and characteristics that are relevant to this project. 
Please refer to the glossary for a description of the networking terms used. 
2.1.1 Internet 
The Internet has grown from a small academic network into a critical extension of 
the public telecommunications infrastructure [12].  In the short period of time since its 
commercial inception in 1995, the Internet has undergone massive expansion, 
increasing its internal complexity and causing a large demand on the underlying 
equipment used to supply connectivity. 
The Internet originated from the funding of the ARPANET in 1969, which was 
designed to test a packet-switching network by the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA) [1].  The goal was to find ways of robustly and reliably transmitting 
data, and led to many of the data communications techniques still in use today.  
Although this was an experimental project, it was already being used for day-to-day 
communications, and so was changed to an operational network in 1975.  In 1983, the 
ARPANET was divided into two separate networks – the MILNET and a new smaller 
ARPANET, which then collectively became known as the Internet. 
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In 1985 the National Science Foundation (NSF) created a new network called the 
NSFNet, which consisted of five smaller networks and connected these to the existing 
Internet.  The NSF had a vision to allow all scientists and engineers across the world 
access to the Internet, and so created a new backbone in 1987.  The Internet then 
evolved into a three tier-architecture, consisting of the backbone, regional and local 
networks.  In 1995 the NSFNet stopped providing the central backbone, and the 
ARPANET officially ceased to exist.  The original ARPANET evolved from a simple 
backbone, to a three-tier structure, and then into the huge interconnection of 
distributed hubs that currently form the Internet.  It has doubled in size since 1983, 
and has continuously grown beyond its originally intended role and size. 
2.1.2 Routing 
The ARPANET used a simple routing algorithm to determine the path of data sent, 
which was based on determining the queuing delay at every link in the network, and 
then propagating these measurements to all routers.  These routers then forwarded 
data packets along the routes that had the least delay [5].  This worked effectively 
under normal circumstances, but led to poor performance under heavy load.  For this 
reason, a new method was introduced under high load, using the path-distance based 
on the number of hops for a packet to reach its destination [13].  This meant that the 
route which had the least number of routing devices on the path was used to send the 
traffic.  This had poorer performance when measured explicitly, but was found to be 
more stable under high load. 
One of the first routing architectures used by the Internet is shown in Figure 1.  
Autonomous Systems (AS) are connected to external routers, which then forwarded all 
traffic between the AS’s using the Internets core routers [1].  Autonomous Systems are 
made up of a network or group of networks that have a common administration and 
routing policies [14], of which there are currently more than 10,000 [15].  By 
combining many hosts within a network to represent a single AS, routers are able to 
only store the addresses of the AS’s, rather than storing the entire collection of IP 
addresses for the individual hosts that they contain. 
It was necessary to send all traffic leaving the AS’s via the core routers.  The core 
routers shown in the figure were responsible for determining the best routes between 
AS’s, which relied on the reachability information that is communicated between 
routers.  These core routers exchanged this routing information using what was known 
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as the Gateway to Gateway Protocol (GGP).  The Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) 
was used separately to pass information between AS’s and the core.  This 
implementation performed effectively for a small network, but was not able to scale 
as the Internet grew in size.  As the Internet grew and multiple networks were added, 
it became important for these agencies to control their routers interaction with other 
routers [5], without the centralised control. 
 
Figure 1.  Basic routing architecture of the original Internet.  This structure required that all 
traffic leaving the AS was sent via the Internet Core’s routers.  An Exterior Gateway Protocol 
(EGP) was used to transmit information to the core, while core routers exchanged routing 
information using a Gateway to Gateway Protocol (GGP). 
 
The current state of the Internet as shown in Figure 2 contains a series of routing 
domains which consist of several AS’s.  These domains are responsible for 
determining the best routes between the various AS’s, and use the Border Gateway 
Protocol (BGP) to share the routing information [5].  This system is decentralized, not 
requiring traffic to be sent through the core, and so scales better than the previous 
structure.  Each AS is able to manage its own internal routing policies, with the 
smaller AS’s opting for simple routing policies (such as raw hop counting), but larger 
AS’s use more advanced techniques to avoid using routes with high delays [5]. 
 
Internet Core 
(GGP routing) 
Core Router Core Router 
External Router External Router 
 
Autonomous 
System #2 
 
Autonomous 
System #1 
EGP routing 
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Figure 2.  Current state of Internet routing with a decentralised architecture.   Each domain uses 
its own protocol to exchange routing information internally, but inter-domain routing uses the 
Border Gateway Protocol (from [1]). 
2.1.3 Border Gateway Protocol 
Although AS’s are capable of using their own internal routing policies, once 
information leaves the AS it is necessary for routers to communicate using the same 
protocol.  The Border Gateway Protocol, now in version 4, is the current standard 
used by Internet routers to exchange routing information [16].  At a broad level, it is 
able to transmit routing information between many AS’s, and is able to provide a high 
level of control and flexibility for inter-domain routing while still successfully 
managing policy and performance criteria.  The protocol supports the Classless 
Interdomain Routing (CIDR) protocol, which provides for using IP prefixes and 
removes the older network classes that were previously used to distinguish networks 
(refer to the Glossary for IP prefixes). 
The configuration of BGP allows for autonomous routing policies to be applied by a 
network administrator, based on requirements such as ensuring good end-to-end 
performance, catering for contractual obligations with clients, load balancing and cost 
reduction strategies [5, 15] 
For these reasons, BGP allows the network administrator to indicate preferences 
that only partially include performance.  From [15], it is noted that the BGP policies 
of the Internet represent the commercial relationships between AS’s.  AS pairs 
generally either form a customer-provider relationship, or a peer-to-peer relationship.  
8 
In the customer-provider relationship, the provider sells the connectivity to the 
customer (such as an ISP that charges home users for their connection), whereas a 
peer-to-peer relationship is between peers who provide connectivity to their customers 
(such as the connectivity provided between ISP’s). 
Use of the BGP policies allows a BGP device to select the list of AS’s to use for 
sending information.  The configurations allow for explicitly refusing to transmit data 
for certain AS’s, but still allowing internal advertisement of these routes.  Some 
performance parameters that can be controlled by the BGP configuration are: 
· Shorter AS paths (i.e. number of AS hops) can be preferred to longer ones. 
· Stable paths should be preferred to unstable paths. 
· Preference of internal routes along an AS path to external routes.  
· Quality of AS paths used to reach a destination.  If multiple AS paths can be 
used to reach a destination, BGP will select a path based on parameters such 
as the link speed and tendency for congestion along the path.  If a BGP 
router is aware that certain AS’s within an AS path perform poorly, it can 
rather use other available AS paths. 
AS’s use BGP to advertise the router’s current set of routes to neighbouring AS’s – 
they never advertise the full set of paths available, but instead only inform other AS’s 
of the subset that they are currently using to transmit data.  BGP includes full AS path 
information in every route advertisement, thereby eliminating the possibility of 
infinite loops from host to host, and BGP does therefore not impose any topological 
restrictions on the ways that AS’s are connected.  For this reason the number and 
configuration of AS’s is arbitrary to the BGP protocol, allowing a large network such 
as the Internet to scale well. 
BGP devices exchange routing information (such as AS paths used) when the 
connection is established initially, and afterwards only using incremental updates.  
Information is only refreshed when updates are received, and so do not rely on any 
scheduled updates from other routers.  The AS paths for the best routes are chosen 
based on a single metric for each available AS route, and this metric is calculated 
using the policies and properties discussed earlier.  The path chosen is determined by 
the path with the lowest metric. 
The BGP protocol runs on top of the TCP protocol [17], which already provides 
fragmentation, retransmission, acknowledgement and sequencing.  TCP is already 
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supported by BGP routers since this is the most used transmission protocol for 
delivering data on the Internet.  The default BGP port is port 179 [10]. 
In [5], the effectiveness of routing paths over the Internet is examined, which is 
primarily due to BGP routing, stating that the overall effect of routing protocols and 
policies on end-to-end performance are poorly understood.  Five different datasets 
were to compare the path of data sent across the Internet.  Metrics such as round-trip 
times and loss rates were used to determine that in 30 to 80 percent of the time a 
better path that could have been selected.  This is partially due to factors such as 
“early-exit” routing, which sends traffic which is bound for an external network to the 
closest exchange point, thereby lowering the local network traffic but ignoring any 
shorter routes.  Even with these concerns, BGP still provides a high level of flexibility 
and customisation, together with scalability and robustness. 
2.1.3.1 Types of BGP Messages 
There are four types of messages supported by the BGP-4 protocol [17, 11]: 
· The Open message is the first command sent between BGP devices and is 
used to establish a BGP session.  Once this has been established, the devices 
are able to send the other types of messages.  
· The Update message provides the latest information for the advertised routes 
used by the BGP device.  It is used to simultaneously advertise new routes 
(known as announcements), and to inform of routes that have become 
unavailable (known as withdrawals).  Advertised routes are those routes that 
the device is actively using for sending data, and does not include paths that 
it is aware of but not using. 
· Notification messages are sent when an error forces the closure of the BGP 
session. 
· The Keep-Alive message is transmitted between BGP devices to provide 
notification that the devices are still active.  This is sent at timed intervals to 
ensure that the BGP session doesn’t expire. 
An additional Route Refresh message was added subsequent to the BGP-4 RFC 
1711 [17] specification.  This has been widely implemented and allows for requesting 
a full retransmission of a peer’s routing information, and was added as a later BGP 
capability in RFC 2918 [18]. 
10 
A BGP session is established after a TCP session has been initiated.  This involves 
one peer sending the Open message, followed by a Keep-Alive message returned by 
the peer.  Once the session has been established, each peer sends their entire set of 
advertised routing information.  After this initial update, only incremental updates are 
exchanged. 
These messages are relevant only for routing status and update information, and are 
independent of the data being transmitted between the routers.  The message that is 
most relevant for this research is the Update message.  BGP routers send Update 
messages to exchange network accessibility information, such as when a new router is 
present that causes the router to change its routing paths.  These changes are what are 
propagated to the surrounding networks. 
Two specific features of BGP are of specific interest to this project – the Minimum 
Route Advertisement Interval (MRAI) property and BGP route flap damping. 
2.1.3.2 Minimum Route Advertisement Interval 
The original BGP protocol includes a property called the Minimum Route 
Advertisement Interval (MRAI).  This is implemented by a BGP peer on the sender 
side, to limit the time between two successive BGP Update messages that provide 
information about the same AS.  This reduces the amount of route exploration that is 
possible [12].  The timer is set to 30 seconds normally, limiting the interval between 
updates to at least 30 seconds.  This is primarily to deal with instability in a time scale 
of tens of seconds [19]. 
2.1.3.3 BGP Route Flap Damping 
BGP route flap damping [19] is another property of interest that is implemented on 
the receiving side of router messages.  This is designed to reduce the effect of edge 
instability propagating further through the Internet, as well as handling instability for 
longer periods of time than MRAI.  It was introduced in the mid 1990’s to prevent 
route flapping, which is a type of oscillation that occurs on BGP networks when a 
route’s availability continuously changes state.  This change of state may then cause a 
router to send frequent updates to surrounding routers about the change in best-routes, 
potentially initiating localised routing instability.  The protocol handles this by only 
allowing a certain number of the updates to be received, after which they are 
suppressed for a period of time.  This attempts to distinguish between routes that 
occasionally fail and those that are persistently unstable [20]. 
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Each receiver keeps a penalty value for every peer-prefix combination that it has 
received.  Whenever it receives an update, this penalty associated with the relevant 
peer-prefix is increased.  When the penalty value reaches a preset suppression 
threshold, the router temporarily stops using this route.  The penalty value undergoes 
continuous decay, so that when the penalty decreases to below reuse threshold the 
route will be available once again.  Alternatively, when the maximum suppression 
time is reached, the route also becomes available.  This ensures that no further updates 
will be sent when there are continuous changes on a route. 
The default BGP route flap damping values for Cisco and Juniper routers are shown 
in Table 1.  Both Cisco and Juniper are large network-equipment suppliers, with 
routers widely deployed across the Internet.  The Cisco routers don’t penalise routers 
re-announcing the same peer-prefix routes, but both default implementations will 
quickly suppress routes if a series of withdrawals for the same peer-prefix 
combination is repeated. 
Table 1.  Default BGP route flap damping for Cisco and Juniper routers. 
Damping Parameter Cisco Value Juniper Value 
Re-announcement penalty 0 1000 
Withdrawal penalty 1000 1000 
Attributes change penalty 500 500 
Suppression threshold 2000 3000 
Half-life time 15 15 
Reuse threshold 750 750 
Max. suppression time (min) 60 60 
 
The research in [21] shows that the BGP route flap damping has not been fully 
deployed across Internet routers, but even if fully deployed the time taken to recover 
from instability would be extended by route flap damping.  Also, the work suggests 
that this partial deployment may worsen the Internet’s response under certain 
conditions.  In [20], the authors also note that the presence of route flap damping can 
cause a substantial delay in convergence times for relatively stable routes. 
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2.2 Worms 
2.2.1 Overview 
The first worms were written as experimental programs starting in the late 1970’s.  
The term ‘worm’ was first used in the programming context in 1979, and was inspired 
by a monster tapeworm from a John Brunner novel.  A few newer definitions of 
worms are listed below: 
· An autonomous intrusion agent, more specifically a software module which 
is able to automatically infect a computer, with the purpose of using it to 
infect another system, causing an exponential expansion [22]. 
· “A worm is a program that can run independently and can propagate a fully 
working version of itself to other machines.  It is derived from the word 
tapeworm, a parasitic organism that lives inside a host and uses its resources 
to maintain itself.” [23, 24] 
· A worm is a stand-alone automated program designed to exploit the network 
to find susceptible computers so that they can infect them with copies of 
themselves.  [7] 
Worms are not parasitically linked to host programs, but capable of propagating by 
themselves, unlike Trojans and viruses which require human intervention to spread 
[25].  The term worm is often used interchangeably with virus, but the latter is defined 
as: 
· A virus is a piece of code that adds itself to other programs, including 
operating systems.  It cannot run independently – it requires that its “host” 
program be run to activate it.  As such, it has an analogy to biological 
viruses – those viruses are not considered alive in the usual sense; instead, 
they invade host cells and corrupt them, causing them to produce new 
viruses [23]. 
· A virus replicates by attaching itself to another program so that the virus’ 
instructions are called during execution of the host program [7]. 
Initial work was done to use worms to perform harmless tasks such as posting 
announcements [25].  The Morris worm in 1988 was the first malicious Internet 
worm, after which it became evident that malevolent or malfunctioning worms could 
be a serious threat.  The increase in worms recently has coincided with the 
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improvement in computer networking, for which the authors in [7] suggest an urgent 
need for automated and coordinated protection measures. 
This section provides an overview of general worm propagation, modelling and 
impact.  This is followed by case studies of the Code Red worm, which is applicable 
to the dataset used for the results in the scope of this work. 
2.2.1.1 The Morris Worm 
In [23], the author analyzed the first attack on the Internet by an Internet worm, 
which was initially thought to be a virus [25].  This worm was called the Morris 
worm, named after the suspected author.  The worm first appeared on 2 November 
1988, and only targeted machines with very specific hardware and operating systems. 
The program consisted of 99 lines of source code, which were compiled on the host 
[22], and gained access to computers by exploiting flaws in the operating system.  It 
then collected information about the host and network to allow it to infect other 
computers.  The computer was able to continuously be re-infected, with each infection 
starting a new process that would attempt to spread.  The effect of this was that the 
computer became increasingly overloaded by these processes, which administrators 
recognised by a gradual degradation in performance.  If left unattended, these 
machines eventually failed due to their swap space or process tables becoming 
exhausted. 
Although the worm did cause several machines to fail as well as a disruption to the 
Internet, there was no code within the worm that caused any explicit damage to the 
system that it ran on.  Even though this was the case, it managed to cripple a large 
portion of the Internet [22]. 
2.2.2 Modelling 
Several studies have attempted to model the propagation of an Internet worm [26, 
27], based on data retrieved from previous worms such as Code Red and Nimda.  
Initial studies based the models on epidemiology research, such as [27].  Figure 3 
shows the classic epidemic spread of a biological worm, which can be simply related 
to that for the spread of a computer worm.  These models are homogenous [6], 
meaning that an infected host has an equal likelihood of infecting the susceptible 
hosts.  Several models have expanded on this, such as [6], which expands on the 
epidemic model but includes the dynamic factors of Internet worms such as patching 
infected computers and the limitation of spread by network traffic. 
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Figure 3.  Classic epidemic spread of a worm.  The curve shows an initial exponential 
propagation, followed by an inverse exponential expansion as the number of susceptible hosts 
rapidly decreases. 
 
The dynamic factors that make a worm difficult to model include human 
countermeasures such as anti-virus programs which remove worms, the patching or 
upgrading susceptible computers making them immune to the worm and the 
configuration of firewalls and routers the block the worm traffic.  An additional factor 
is the disconnection of computers from a network until a more effective method to 
remove the worm is made available [6]. 
These models do help to explain how worms spread, but do not include worm-
specific traits (such as the Code Red worm which was programmed to stop 
propagation at a specific time).  It is also difficult to model the effects of a worm, 
since the data from the effect of the multiple worms cannot be separated.  This was 
the case with the Code-Red I and Code-Red II worms, where the two worms were 
actively disrupting the Internet at the same time [27] 
2.2.3 Propagation 
Although it is probably not the intention of the writers of worms to slow down the 
Internet, since this slows the rate at which worms spread, worms do have a significant 
effect on the Internet as a whole.  Ports that are being used to transmit the worm can 
be temporarily blocked at firewalls and routers to limit the worm spread, but this also 
disrupts the flow of any valid traffic using these ports. 
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If abnormally high load is caused, the infrastructure that is used to send information 
can become overloaded (such as Internet routers), which in turn degrades all transfer 
of data on the Internet.  This includes traffic that is not related to propagation of the 
worm, i.e. traffic that uses different ports to propagate. 
Some of the factors that contribute to the propagation of worms are [6]: 
· The human countermeasures discussed above.  Examples include patching 
computers, blocking worm traffic and fire-walling worm traffic. 
· As the Internet becomes overloaded, the worm takes longer and longer to 
transmit itself to new hosts, due to the high traffic on the Internet. 
· As the number of infected hosts increase, the number of susceptible hosts 
correspondingly decreases. 
An interesting side-effect of either disconnecting the computers from the Internet, or 
the difficulty imposed in communicating with other computers due to the slowness of 
the Internet, is that a computer may be unable to retrieve the information required to 
immunise the computer.  An example of this was with the Morris worm [23], when a 
temporary way of immunising the computer was posted on a news group.  The spread 
of this solution was hampered because many computers were disconnected from the 
Internet to ensure that they wouldn’t become infected, and as a result were unable to 
remove the worm. 
2.2.4 Impact 
Recent worms, such as the Blaster and SQL Slammer worms in 2003, have shown 
that worms continue to spread even with widely used anti-virus software, firewalls 
and the newer Intrusion Detection Software (IDS) [7].  Worms have also evolved to 
the stage where they are now able to attack computers using multiple types of 
infections, and are able to update themselves dynamically from the Internet and 
actively attack anti-virus software. 
Once a worm has spread to a host, the attacker has effective control over all the 
infected computers.  With that control, the attacker is able to launch a distributed 
denial-of-service attack against one or many hosts, crippling the host’s ability to serve 
content.  This has a severe impact on companies such as Amazon.com which rely on 
the Internet for their business.  The worms are also able to access any sensitive 
information on the computer, possibly retransmitting this information so that it is 
available to the attacker.  This sensitive information could include credit card 
16 
numbers, email address books, archived email correspondence or any other 
information on the computer [27].  Additionally, information can be corrupted by the 
worm, creating confusion and a lack of trust for all the information available on the 
computer. 
The Lirva worm, released in January 2003, had the ability to email Windows dial-up 
networking passwords to the worm author.  It also connected to websites to download 
and install the Back Orifice software, which provides full control of the computer to 
the hacker over the Internet [7]. 
The cost effect of worms and viruses is difficult to estimate, since it is a 
combination of the time spent analysing and patching the problem, as well as the loss 
of productivity by end-users who are unable to use their computers or the Internet.  
The effect of worms in the public and private sector has been estimated to cost 
millions of dollars.  The Code-Red worm which spread on 19 July 2001, together with 
subsequent strains, caused approximately $2.6 billion [9].  The estimated cost of SQL 
Slammer was estimated at $1 billion [28].  From [7], the cost of the LoveLetter worm 
caused $7 billion in damages, and the Melissa email worm from 1999 created at least 
$80 million in damages. 
The following is an indication of the speed at which worms are able to spread: 
· The Code-Red II worm required less than 14 hours to reach its saturation of 
more than 359,000 infections, with the worms spread peaking at just over 
2,000 infections per minute [25]. 
· The Nimda worm, which had five different methods of attacking hosts, 
managed to spread to 450,000 hosts in its first 12 hours of propagation [7]. 
· The SQL Slammer worm targeted a buffer overflow vulnerability in 
computers running Microsoft’s SQL Server.  The worm infected at least 
75,000 hosts over a period of approximately 10 minutes [29]. 
From the examples above, worms are capable of causing a large amount of damage 
simply through their rapid propagation.  Anti-virus software and intrusion detection 
will continue to improve, but are limited in their ability to detect novel worms.  A 
significant number of computers connected to the Internet don’t have anti-virus 
software running or the latest operating system patches, and are therefore susceptible 
to worms.  For these reasons, worms will continue to remain a threat. 
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2.2.5 Prevention 
The study in [9] concludes by listing the methods required in containing a worm.  
The first, Reaction Time, is the time taken to detect the worm which they suggest 
should be automated to be effective.  The second method is the Containment Strategy, 
which is the means to isolate a computer from susceptible hosts.  The last method is 
the Blocking Location, which is how the countermeasure system is deployed.  The 
study concludes that this should be implemented across almost all Internet paths for 
the system to be effective, requiring a large amount of cooperation between 
companies and organisations. 
Some of the methods used to prevent worms from [30] are: 
· Compile-time software protection is the ideal approach whereby programs 
are released without bugs that can be exploited by worms. 
· Run-time software protection which is the ability to detect misuse by 
analysing signatures of worms, which relies on the tool used to have the 
patterns already installed.  Anomaly detection is also included in this 
category, and relies on detecting of some of the patterns of a worm’s 
behaviour. 
· Network filtering is the means of blocking worm traffic on a network.  
Address blacklisting is used to block traffic from suspected worm sources 
using firewalls.  Advance worm filtering is a preventative method of 
blocking vulnerabilities before a worm has been detected or written.  
Content filtering is used to detect worms by scanning traffic sent through a 
network, but this method is difficult to deploy due to the high load of traffic 
that should be scanned and the problems with dealing with false positives.  
Honeypots are computers that are deployed on the Internet with no purpose 
except being made available to attacks.  It is assumed that any traffic sent to 
them might be malicious (such as a worm), and this traffic can be analysed 
to detect worms. 
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2.3 Code Red Case Study 
2.3.1 Overview 
A serious vulnerability was announced by Microsoft on June 18th 2001 [6], which 
affected Microsoft Windows systems running Internet Information Service (IIS), 
Microsoft’s web-server.  Since the purpose of a web-server is to provide content to 
client browsers such as Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox, many of the computers 
running the web-server were accessible to the Internet, although some may have been 
used solely for internal company Intranets. 
In less than a month after the vulnerability was announced on July 12th 2001, the 
Code Red I worm emerged which exploited this IIS vulnerability [21].  A newer strain 
of the worm called Code Red I v2 began to propagate on July 19th 2001.  This version 
of the worm was designed to stop propagating at 0:00 on the 20th of each month.  On 
the 4th of August 2001, a new worm emerged, called the Code-Red II worm. 
This section provides a more detailed description of the Code-Red I and Code-Red 
II worms which infected hosts during 2001.  This specific worm has been selected for 
analysis, since it occurs within the time period for the data used in this project. 
2.3.2 Chronology of Events 
The following table summaries the incidents relating to the Code Red worm [6, 25]: 
Table 2.  Significant dates for the spread of the Code-Red worms. 
Date Event 
June 18, 2001 eEye provided information about a buffer-overflow vulnerability 
in Microsoft’s IIS web server. 
June 26, 2001 Microsoft released a patch for the vulnerability. 
July 12, 2001 Code Red I v1 started to exploit the vulnerability. 
July 19, 2001 
Approx 10:00 UTC 
The Code Red I v2 variant emerged, which was observed to probe 
new hosts, sharply increasing the number of infected hosts. 
August 4, 2001 A new worm emerges, named Code Red II.   
 
The worm was only capable of spreading on Windows 2000 with IIS installed, part 
of the code is invalid on the Windows NT operating system [9] and causes these and 
other systems to crash [31]. 
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2.3.2.1 Code Red I 
After infecting a computer, the first version of Code-Red initially determines if the 
date on the computer is between the 1st and the 19th of the month.  In this case, a 
random list of IP addresses is generated, and each is attacked in order to allow the 
worm to propagate.   
A serious limitation of this version was that the seed used to generate the list of IP 
addresses was static, and so each computer continuously generated identical lists.  
This permitted the worm to propagate to the computers in the list, but once these hosts 
were infected, the computer was unable to spread to additional computers.  This 
caused the worm to spread slowly. 
Between the 20th and 28th of the month, the worm was designed to stop spreading, 
and instead launch a denial of service attack against the website 
http://www1.whitehouse.gov.  The worm is not active after the 28th of the month, but 
begins spreading again on the 1st day of the following month. 
The Code Red I v2 variant appeared on July 19th, 2001.  This variant was similar to 
the previous version, except that it used a random seed to generate the list of hosts to 
infect.  The worm polled computers in the list of random IP addresses at 
approximately 11 hosts every minute.  Another difference between this version and 
the previous version is the text “Hacked by Chinese” inserted at the top of some web 
pages generated by the IIS web server. 
Both the initial and variant versions of the Code Red I worm are not stored on the 
computer, so a simple reboot completely removes the worm from the computer.  But, 
since the vulnerability is still present on restart, the computer is open to being re-
infected.  The worm omits the loopback and multicast IP addresses. 
2.3.2.2 Code Red II 
Although similarly named to the Code Red I worm, this worm is not a variant or 
new version of the Code Red I worm.  It was named due to some of the source code 
containing the phrase “CodeRedII”.  This worm exploits the same Microsoft IIS 
vulnerability as the Code Red I worm [25]. 
When infecting a new machine, the worm checks to see whether the worm is 
already present on the host.  If not, it creates a backdoor and then waits for a day, 
creating a new vulnerability.  After this wait is over, the machine reboots itself and the 
worm starts to spread. 
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The worm has various rules for determining its behaviour when propagating itself: 
· If the system language is ‘Chinese (Taiwanese)’ or ‘Chinese (PRC)’ it uses 
600 threads to propagate, otherwise 300 threads are used. 
· When selecting which host to probe, a random IP address is created and 
modified according to various rules to predominately infect computers 
within the same area.  One in eight probes will use the randomly generated 
IP address (same as Code Red I), three-eights of attacks will modify the 
random IP to fall within the same /8 IP prefix of the network and the 
remaining half of the attacks will be within the same /16 IP prefix of the 
network.  An example of the /8 IP selection is that a host with address 
66.102.11.99 will then poll addresses starting with 66.xxx.xxx.xxx. 
· The loopback and multicast IP addresses are ignored. 
This version doesn’t modify any web pages or launch Denial-of-Service attacks, but 
allows for any code to be executed using the backdoor that the worm creates.  This 
provides the means for the worm writer to exploit the system at any point later until 
the worm is removed.  The Nimda worm used this backdoor as one of its methods of 
propagation. 
2.3.3 Impact and Patching 
From the detailed analysis performed in [25], the Code Red I v2 worm infected 
more than 359,000 computers in less than 14 hours.  The overall cost of Code Red, 
including all strains cost an estimated $2.6 billion.  The infection rate reached more 
than 2,000 infected hosts per minute.  The primary defence against the Code-Red 
worm was ad-hoc containment by individual networks by system administrators – 
such as by blocking inbound traffic on TCP port 80, or filtering content to find the 
worm signature [9].  From the experimental evidence in [25], it is evident that human 
administrators are not able to slow the spread of a worm in under 24 hours.  
A web server survey performed by Netcraft indicated that there were approximately 
6 million Windows IIS instances at the end of June 2001 [32].  Conflicting estimates 
of the percentage of hosts infected by Code-Red I v2 to those that were susceptible 
differ, with [27] concluding that almost all online susceptible hosts were infected, 
while later research in [6] estimates approximately 60% were infected. 
From the work done in [25], network monitors were installed to gather data about 
the spread of the Code Red I and II worms.  By mapping the IP addresses of infected 
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host machines to countries, they were able to conclude that the worm was an 
international event – physical and geographical boundaries did not affect the spread of 
the worm.  Home and small business web-servers were as severely impacted as 
corporations, demonstrating the impartiality of the worm.   
In the same study, the rate at which users patched infected computers showed that 
the number of patched computers increased slowly towards the end of July 2001, 
while the worm was not propagating.  On the 1st of August 2001, only about 32% of 
infected hosts had been patched, even though there was widespread media coverage of 
the worm and its effects.  Only once the worm had restarted its propagation cycle at 
the beginning of August 2001 did the rate at which infected hosts were patched 
increase, reaching approximately 64% of hosts patched by 28 August 2004. 
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3 Novelty Detection using Neural Networks 
 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to general neural networks and novelty 
detection.  This if followed by a more detailed description of the autoencoder, which 
is a specialised type of neural network used for novelty detection. 
There are several methods available to solve a problem for approximating a 
system’s behaviour, with the choice of solution dependant on the type of system and 
the data available.  A problem-solving system is used to map data from the input 
space to the domain space, and then into the solution space.  The ideal mapping from 
the input space to the domain space is known as the objective function of the system.  
The following list shows some of the methods available [33]: 
· Statistical methods are useful when the data can be represented statistically, 
and the underlying objective function is already defined. 
· Symbolic AI rule-based systems for well defined problems with fixed rules, 
and when the variation of a more advanced system is not required or too 
difficult to construct. 
· Fuzzy systems for when the problem knowledge is heuristic.  These systems 
are vague and ill-defined but are useful when little data is available. 
· Neural networks are suited for when the problem knowledge is not well 
understood and the objective function is unknown.  These require data for 
training and validation, from which the network extracts the problem 
knowledge. 
3.1 Neural Networks 
A neural network is a computational model based on the biology of the human brain 
[33].  The processing elements within the model are neurons, which are 
interconnected to perform the calculations.  The connections between the various 
neurons are weighted, to provide the long-term memory for the system.  The neurons 
combine the values received from each of the connections, and perform calculations 
before sending values to other neurons via more weighted connections. 
The structure of a basic neural network called a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) is 
shown in Figure 4, with m input neurons, two hidden neurons and n output neurons.  
The input layer’s neurons are connected to each of the hidden layer’s neurons, which 
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are in turn connected to the output neurons.  Each connection carries a certain weight 
which is determined during training.  Neural networks can be connected in several 
ways, the figure shows the most commonly used generic example. 
 
Figure 4.  Basic structure of a neural network.  The various layers are connected using several 
weighted connections which are assigned values during training. 
 
MLP’s were used only after methods of training them had been developed.  A 
simple training method is called the backpropagation algorithm, which is used to 
continuously adjust the network connection weights based on the error that is fed back 
when learning from training examples.  A more advanced training technique is the 
Scaled Conjugate Gradient (SCG) method, which is able to reach a local minimum in 
orders of magnitude faster than the backpropagation technique, but is far more 
complex. 
Some of the general features of a neural network are [33]: 
· Learning - the network is capable of learning without any previous 
knowledge.  This is performed by training the system with a set of training 
input-output pairs (supervised learning), or with only input data 
(unsupervised learning). 
· Generalisation – the network is able to generate a best output when 
presented with input data that the network hasn’t seen before. 
· Massive parallelism – when computing the output values, the network is 
able to process many neuron calculations simultaneously. 
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· Robust – if some of the neurons within the network have been poorly 
trained, the network as a whole may still be able to generate strong results.  
A properly configured and trained neural network is able to implicitly represent the 
underlying hidden knowledge of a system, which may not be obvious to a human 
observer.  It is also able to use noisy, missing and corrupted data and still provide 
good output [33]. 
3.2 Novelty Detection 
Novelty detection is the ability to distinguish a level of novel behaviour from what 
is considered normal behaviour [34].  This approach only requires normal behaviour 
to be defined, from which abnormalities can then be identified against this description 
[35].  Systems trained to detect novelty are unable to detect faults, but can robustly 
identify anomalies even when the system has never seen the fault before. 
As noted for the tests performed in [35], novelty detection can be effective in fault 
detection and prediction for a single type of fault, but attempting to predict additional 
faults may not be as effective.  The tests performed in their work used a neural 
network to detect real faults, and were found to retrospectively provide an effective 
measure of a single fault.  It was essential that the inputs to the neural network were 
not corrupted by any faults, otherwise the results became unreliable. 
3.2.1 Autoencoder 
The auto-associative neural network (or autoencoder) is a specialised type of neural 
network that has the ability to detect novel behaviour.  The network is trained using 
only normal behaviour, so that when data is presented that falls outside of the 
acceptable trained behaviour, the network is able to show this novelty.  This 
behaviour is not necessarily “good” or “bad”, it simply falls outside of the data that 
the network has been trained with [34]. 
The basic structure of an autoencoder consists of the same number of inputs as 
outputs.  The training requires teaching the network to attempt to match each output to 
the corresponding input, so that the error between inputs and outputs is low for the 
normal or training data, but varies when the input dataset is unrecognised. 
The autoencoder has the following features [34]: 
· Principal Component Analysis (a widely-recognised method for 
dimensionality reduction, applications include pattern recognition and image 
processing [36]) 
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· Information compression 
· Recovery of missing sensory data 
· Implicitly learn characteristics of the underlying data 
The structure of an autoencoder is shown in Figure 5.  The auto-associative nature 
of the network is provided in the training phase, with the same values used for inputs 
and outputs.  The hidden layer provides a “bottleneck”, mapping the input space onto 
a reduced dimensional space.  The output of a trained network will be similar to the 
inputs if the input is similar to the training dataset.  If the data provided to the trained 
network is not similar to the training dataset, the outputs will differ from the inputs.   
 
Figure 5.  Autoencoder structure with training inputs equal to outputs.  The outputs are trained 
to match the inputs as closely as possible.  The number of hidden neurons should be kept to less 
than the number of inputs. 
 
Since there is often more than one input-output pair for a neural network, a method 
is required to provide a single measure for the degree of novelty of the input data.  
The method used in [34] simply takes the sum of the differences between the inputs 
and the outputs.  Another method is to use the mean-square value for the differences 
between the inputs and the outputs, as in (1). 
( )( )å -= n nn itne 1
21  (1) 
where n is the number of inputs and outputs, tn is the nth output and in is the nth 
input.  The resultant error value e is the level of novelty of the combined outputs. 
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The novelty output of the autoencoder is a relative value, since it is only comparable 
to other novelty values from the same trained autoencoder.  Therefore, a relative 
threshold value should be determined, so that any values above this threshold are 
novel, and values below this can be considered normal.  The threshold can then be set 
by looking at the outputs for real data, and deciding based on the range of the outputs 
which seem most likely to be novel.  Otherwise, if a novel value is already known for 
the real dataset, the novelty output of the autoencoder for this data can be used as a 
guideline for the threshold. 
3.2.2 Testing the Autoencoder 
The autoencoder has been tested using both simulation and real-world data in [34], 
with promising results.  The first test was performed by training a neural network 
using generated Gaussian white noise.  The network consisted of 20 input and output 
neurons, and 18 neurons in the hidden layer.  The input-output pairs represented a 
sliding window of the input data, with the first neuron representing the current data 
value, the second the value for the previous discrete time frame, and so on for all 
subsequent inputs.  The network was trained using approximately 20,000 training 
datasets of generated noise.  The following were performed to test the usefulness of 
this autoencoder: 
· Another noise pattern to that used for training was applied to the input 
(generated in the same way as the training data); with the output showing 
very little change throughout, indicating that the input contained no 
significant novelty (see Figure 6). 
· The second test used two Gaussian-shaped pulses in combination with the 
generated noise.  It is evident from the novelty values shown in Figure 7 that 
the autoencoder is able to successfully distinguish these pulses from the 
noise. 
· The next test used a simulated noisy sinusoidal wave as input (see Figure 8).  
The novelty result of the output from the network showed the sinusoidal 
pattern of the input far more clearly than the input noisy sinusoidal wave.  
The purpose for this test was to show that the system is capable of detecting 
more than just pulses. 
In the same paper, the authors used real world data gathered from CPU load of a 
computer which was measured in intervals.  The results were promising in that the 
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autoencoder was able to implicitly learn the parameters of this system, and correctly 
identify novel behaviour. 
 
Figure 6.  Generated noise applied to the autoencoder.  The top graph shows the generated noisy 
input, and the resulting novelty value is shown below (from [34]). 
 
 
Figure 7.  Noisy generated Gaussian-shaped pulse applied to the autoencoder.  The top graph 
shows this input, and the resulting novelty value is shown below (from [34]). 
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Figure 8.  Noisy generated sinusoidal wave applied to the autoencoder.  The top graph shows this 
input, and the resulting novelty is shown below.  This demonstrates the networks ability to filter 
out the noise and extract the sinusoid, which is not clearly visible from the input graph (from 
[34]). 
 
A disadvantage of the autoencoder is that the set of normal data-points must be 
selected.  This technique is often reliant on human selection of the standard data-
points. 
3.2.3 Normalisation 
A commonly used method of pre-processing the data for a neural network is to use 
normalisation.  This involves adjusting the values supplied to the inputs of the neural 
networks to the same scope [33], usually to the range [0,1] or [-1,1].  Without 
normalisation, the variable with the largest scale will dominate the output, whereas 
with normalisation the inputs have equal importance.  It is necessary to perform a 
reverse transformation on the output values to transfer the values back into the 
original data range, if required. 
Two methods of normalisation are linear and logarithmic [33].  Linear 
normalisation uses the formula: 
( ) ( )min,max,min,, / iiiijnormij xxxxx --=  (2) 
where xij is the value being normalised, xij,norm is the normalised value and xi,min and 
xi,max  are the minimum and maximum values for the variable xi. 
Logarithmic normalisation is effective when the domain used for an input is very 
wide, so applying a logarithmic normalisation to the input reduces the dynamic range 
of the data.  This technique has not been used in this project since linear normalisation 
is sufficient, so no further explanation is provided. 
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3.3 Effect of Worms on BGP 
This section forms the basis of the research for this project, by providing a 
justification for the choice of input for the neural network, which is explained later. 
Worms have the ability to not only affect the computers at the endpoints of the 
Internet, but are also able to impact the infrastructure connecting these computers 
together [10].  From the research performed in [10], it was shown that the Code-Red 
and Nimda worms were responsible for the global Internet outages during 2001.  Of 
particular interest to this project, it was also evident that the number of BGP 
announcement messages increased significantly during these times.  Edge network 
administrators reported "insane ARP storms", router failures, congestion slowdowns 
and connectivity problems during the Nimda attack.[11] 
It is difficult to determine Internet weather from an endpoint, since this only gives 
an impression at that point [11].  Even monitoring load in the Internet’s core (such as 
load through routers) doesn’t provide a reliable impression for the end-users 
experience of the Internet speed.  For this reason, research has shifted to examining 
the routing data itself, rather than the load though the routers.  The most surprising 
effect of this research is that outages within the Internets core – such as router failures 
or fibre cuts – do not significantly affect the routing data sent by routers. 
According to [11], there are two main goals for using routing information to 
monitor Internet instability – reachability and rates of change.  Reachability is used to 
determine how many autonomous systems can be reached by a router.  Rates of 
change are used to measure the number of BGP Update messages (announcements 
and withdrawals) that have been sent in a specified time.  Since BGP has a limit on 
the number of messages that can be sent from a router about a route change within 30 
seconds (which is the BGP route flap damping effect described previously), if the 
route continuously changes in each time period this signifies that the diversity of the 
routes is increasing. 
3.3.1 BGP Impact from Code-Red and Nimda Worms 
From the research performed in [11], which was analysed during the period June to 
September 2001, the authors analysed several occurrences that affected the Internet: 
· The Baltimore train wrecks on 18 July 2001, which eliminated many fibre 
links. 
· The Code-Red II worm which started affecting the Internet on 19 July 2001. 
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· The World Trade Centre attacks on 9 September 2001. 
· The Nimda worm which occurred on 18 September 2001. 
The graph shown in Figure 9 shows a logarithmic plot of the total number of 
aggregated BGP prefixes announced (or BGP announcements) between 1 June 2001 
and 24 September 2001.  These were collected from a single router that has 13 RIPE 
NCC [37] collection points which are based in London, Paris, Amsterdam, Geneva 
and Vienna.  The router provides an interconnection between many small European 
networks as well as many global 1-tier providers.  Each point on the graph represents 
the number of BGP prefixes announced for a 30-second time slice.  These collection 
points continuously log information about the traffic passing through, including the 
BGP messages such as the number of announcements. 
 
Figure 9.  Number of BGP announcement messages sent from June to September 2001 from 13 
RIPE NCC collection points.  The arrows indicate the increase in messages caused by the Code-
Red and Nimda worms (from [11]). 
 
The authors in [11] observed significant daily and weekly trends in this data, 
possibly due to fluctuations in traffic load, or otherwise due to network administrators 
performing maintenance shutdowns of routers (which makes routes via the router 
unavailable).  The non-periodic effects that are evident are the sharp increases on July 
19th and September 18th, which correspond to the Code-Red II and Nimda worms 
respectively.  It is interesting to note that the Baltimore train wreck and the World 
Trade Centre attacks do not feature noticeably on this graph. 
The graph in Figure 10 shows an expanded view of the number of BGP 
announcements from the RIPE NCC routers on 19 July 2001.  The y-axis is 
logarithmic, showing an eight-fold exponential increase in the number of updates.  
The increase was present for approximately eight hours, and was initially thought to 
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be a delayed reaction to the Baltimore train wreck which had occurred on the previous 
day. 
 
Figure 10.  Increase of BGP announcements from several RIPE NCC routers around the time of 
the Code-Red II worm (from [11]). 
 
The increase in BGP announcement messages caused by the Nimda worm is shown 
below in Figure 11.  The y-axis on this plot is also logarithmic, and over a period of 
two hours increase exponentially by a factor of 25, after which it slowly decreased for 
the next few days and reached pre-worm levels only on 24 September 2001. 
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Figure 11.  Increase of BGP updates from the RIPE NCC routers caused by the Nimda worm on 
18 September 2001 (from [11]). 
3.3.2 BGP Impact from SQL Slammer Worm 
The SQL Slammer worm first appeared on 25 January 2003, and exploited hosts 
running the Microsoft SQL Resolution Service [10].  The worm was able to infect 
over 75,000 hosts in just over 30 minutes, becoming the fastest spreading worm in 
history [8].  The worm was capable of scanning at 55 million hosts per second at its 
peak, and doubled the number of scans every eight minutes, compared to Code-Red 
II’s doubling rate of about 37 minutes [10].  As in the case with the Code-Red and 
Nimda worms, the SQL Slammer worm wasn’t directly targeting the Internet routing 
infrastructure.  It also caused extensive damage and downtime for many users, even 
those not directly infected by the worm. 
The SQL Slammer worm used the UDP protocol to propagate, unlike the Code-Red 
and Nimda worms which relied on the TCP protocol.  Even with this difference, the 
number of BGP messages sent by routers was similarly affected to that of the Code-
Red and Nimda increases [8, 38], which is also shown in Figure 12.  Using data 
collected from several AS’s, the decrease in the number of routes due to SQL 
Slammer is plotted in Figure 13. 
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Figure 12.  Number of BGP announcements (left) and withdrawals (right) during the SQL 
Slammer attack in 2003.  This information was extracted from routers in three different 
autonomous systems (from [21]). 
 
 
 
Figure 13.    Available best-routes for several Autonomous Systems at the time of the SQL 
Slammer worm (from [10]).  The number of routes drops significantly for the various AS’s at the 
time of the attack. 
 
The analysis performed in [21] shows how a local disturbance on the Internet can be 
propagated globally, with the edge networks affected by the SQL Slammer worm 
causing global routing problems.  It was also noted that the presence of BGP route 
flap damping assisted in reducing the size of the SQL Slammer BGP storm, but in 
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itself was not enough to stop the storm.  From the analysis, it was also clear that many 
of the routers did not have damping installed or enabled during the worm outbreak.  
This was evident by the penalty values for the damping far exceeding the default 
values when routes should have been suppressed.  The research also points out that 
implementing damping at all core Internet routers (the RFC in [19] recommends 
deploying damping only at core routers) will make a significant improvement.  
Further, this limits the number of BGP Updates that can be sent between routers 
closer to the Internet edge.  The study concludes by saying that the partial 
implementation of route damping is only part of the problem because for certain 
network topologies the partial implementation of damping could actually worsen 
routing performance. 
Another study in [20] showed that BGP damping was also responsible for slow 
convergence times for recovering from edge instability.  It was seen that instability 
from one end of a network is able to trigger BGP damping in another end of the 
network, which is undesirable since this increases the convergence time for the 
network. 
3.3.3 BGP Behaviour for Worms and Outages 
The constant stream of BGP announcement and withdrawal messages is called a 
“BGP message storm” [11], and additionally causes increased Internet load.  The 
effects of these storms can be summarised by the following list of suspected causes 
from [11]: 
· BGP session timeouts caused by increased load 
· BGP session failures due to high CPU loads on the routers 
· Disconnection of networks by administrators protecting against the worm 
· Failure of equipment at the Internet edge (such as DSL routers) 
As a further justification of the fourth suspected cause above, it was noted in [10] 
that Cisco Systems Inc released an advisory notifying customers that hardware not 
using Microsoft IIS server had been affected during the time of the Code-Red II 
outbreak.  The hardware had been impacted by the side affects of the worm. 
In [39], the storms are referred to as “route flap storms”, which are caused when 
routers fail during instability.  This is described by router’s long periods of instability 
causing them to frequently update their routing tables.  Many Internet routers are 
based on older processors, which are sufficient under normal load but for the longer 
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periods with higher load the routers can either fail or simply take too long to send 
BGP Keep-Alive messages.  In either event, this causes the router’s peers to drop it 
from any AS paths that it is used in.  This in turn forces these peer routers to select 
alternate routes that don’t use the unavailable router, and in doing so several BGP 
announcement messages are sent from these routers.  When the router either reboots 
or recovers from the instability, it attempts to re-establish connections with the peer 
routers which try to revert to using it again in their AS paths.  This causes more BGP 
withdrawal messages to be sent.  This is the scenario that the BGP route flap damping 
has been designed to assist with. 
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4 Methodology Implemented 
 
This section describes the methods used to collect the data from the router, to 
convert the data into normalised data for the autoencoder, as well as the way in which 
the neural network was trained.  
The autoencoder has been selected to provide the prediction of the presence of a 
worm.  This was used rather than standard neural-network classification, since much 
of the data appeared to be normal.  There were also concerns that the remaining data 
caused by a worm would be treated as noise by a standard neural network classifier.  
As explained earlier, the autoencoder’s inherent ability to implicitly determine the 
system parameters without prior knowledge is useful for this application, since little is 
understood about the underlying behaviour of the data. 
There has been no attempt to model or characterise the behaviour of worms or their 
effect on the Internet, due to the complexities of the various types of worms and their 
means of propagation.  These complexities include the difficulties of isolating the 
effects of individual worms at a global routing level, and the different types of worm’s 
pre-programmed idiosyncratic behaviours (such as the Code-Red I worms preset 
ability to stop propagating on the 20th of the month).  By using neural networks, it is 
hoped that the network is able to learn the system characteristics of the Internet’s 
routing behaviour without requiring a model.  This should make the system more 
robust in the manner in which it would be able to detect new worms, since no 
assumptions have been made about previous worms.  Also, the training of the 
autoencoder doesn’t require any data or information about worms, so the results 
shown are independent of any training for a specific worm.  The system should 
perform in a similar manner when presented with a worm it hasn’t seen before. 
4.1 Data Collection 
The single router that was chosen is the rrc00.ripe.net router [40], which collects 
data from 15 peer routers, and is based at RIPE NCC [41] in Amsterdam.  The RIPE 
NCC project collects data from more than 300 IPv4 and IPv6 peers at 12 data 
collection points throughout the world.  The routers run a program to continuously 
collect routing data, which is stored in the MRT binary format [42].  This is 
compressed information containing all the BGP routing information for the router.  
The information is stored in two ways – either with all BGP packets, or alternatively 
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with the entire BGP routing tables which are dumped every eight hours.  The data for 
this router is available from October 1999, and is available without restrictions when 
used for research purposes. 
Since this project is interested with the BGP Update messages for this router, the 
entire BGP data available for this router was downloaded for the period June 2001 to 
September 2001, which correlates to the same time period as the effect of worms on 
BGP which was discussed in the literature.  Software was written to extract the BGP 
messages from the binary data, using available MRT libraries.  The number of BGP 
Update messages – both announcement and withdrawal messages – was extracted 
from the raw data, together with a timestamp for each message and was extracted into 
a MySQL database.  Information such as the AS from which the data was received 
has been removed.  The structure of the raw data stored in the database is shown in 
Table 3.  This data has been logged by the data collection program as it is received.  
There was no grouping based on time, which is evident from the values shown in the 
table since the timestamp for all entries is the same. 
Table 3.  Sample BGP Update data extracted from the rrc00.ripe.net router’s raw data.  These 
values were received during the same second. 
Timestamp BGP Announcements BGP Withdrawals 
2001-06-10 00:12:44 2 0 
2001-06-10 00:12:44 0 5 
2001-06-10 00:12:44 1 0 
2001-06-10 00:12:44 3 0 
 
The data is not useful as input in this format, so the data was then grouped into 
various time buckets.  This involved splitting the time period of interest into fixed 
time intervals, and then counting the total number of announcement and withdrawal 
messages that fall within this time period.  Three new datasets were created using this 
method, with one-, five- and fifteen-minute time intervals for each bucket.  An extract 
from the fifteen-minute dataset is shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4.  Sample BGP Update data when grouped into intervals of fifteen minutes. 
Start of Time Interval Total BGP Announcements Total BGP Withdrawals 
2001-06-10 00:00:00 9805 1997 
2001-06-10 00:15:00 10772 1582 
2001-06-10 00:30:00 16576 1406 
2001-06-10 00:45:00 7424 1385 
2001-06-10 01:00:00 10757 1667 
4.2 Autoencoder Structure 
The basic structure for the autoencoder used is shown in Figure 14.  The number of 
input-output pairs is chosen initially, together with the number of neurons in the 
hidden layer.  The way that the data collected is represented in the neural network is 
by taking half of the input neurons for the BGP announcements, and the other half for 
the BGP withdrawals.  The data from the previous section is normalised and 
reorganised into the structure shown below:  
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where i represents each of the inputs, ranging between i and 2n inputs, with n BGP 
announcement inputs as well as n BGP withdrawal inputs.  The (#announcements) 
and (#withdrawals) is the number of normalised BGP announcements and 
withdrawals respectively within the specified time interval.  So, (#announcements)t is 
the number of normalised BGP announcements for the current time period t, while 
(#announcements)t-(n-1) is the (n-1)th  previous time periods number of normalised 
BGP announcements. 
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Figure 14.  Mapping of data-points to the autoencoder inputs.  The first n inputs are mapped 
from the BGP announcements, and the next n inputs are from the BGP withdrawals.  The 
current time interval’s values are used, together with previous values providing historical data to 
the system. 
 
This structure for the inputs provides information about the current as well as 
previous number of announcement and withdrawal messages for the given interval.  
The separation between the number of announcements and withdrawals has been 
determined to allow the neural network to provide the network with as much 
information as possible, rather than using the sum of both which would provide the 
total number of BGP Updates for the interval. 
The data gathered in the previous section is divided into datasets determined by the 
structure presented above.  This creates the same number of datasets as the number of 
time intervals that there are time intervals for – with each dataset containing the 
current time interval’s number of BGP announcements and withdrawals, as well as for 
the previous time periods.  An un-normalised example dataset with n=2 (number of 
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BGP announcements as well as the number of withdrawals) is shown in Table 5.  This 
sample dataset contains information for the current time period (at time t) and the 
previous time period (time (t-1)). 
Table 5.  Sample un-normalised dataset containing current and historical BGP Update 
information.  Each row represents a single dataset (excluding the timestamp), with one dataset 
for each time interval. 
Start Timestamp 
No. 
announcements 
(time = t) 
No. 
announcements 
(time = t-1) 
No. 
withdrawals 
(time = t) 
No. 
withdrawals 
(time = t-1) 
2001-06-10 00:15:00 10772 9805 1582 1997 
2001-06-10 00:30:00 16576 10772 1406 1582 
2001-06-10 00:45:00 7424 16576 1385 1406 
2001-06-10 01:00:00 10757 7424 1667 1385 
 
Each individual input is then normalised using the technique described previously in 
section 3.2.3.  The resultant normalised dataset example for the previous table is 
shown in Table 6.  Note that all input columns contain a value ranging [0, 1].  Various 
numbers of inputs were used for testing, for which the entire dataset were recreated 
and normalised. 
Table 6.  Sample normalised dataset used as input to the autoencoder, with four inputs to the 
autoencoder (n=2).  Each row has been normalised to the range [0, 1]. 
Start Timestamp Input 1 
(#announcements)t 
Input 2 
(#announcements)t-1 
Input 3 
(#withdrawals)t 
Input 4 
(#withdrawals)t-1 
2001-06-10 00:15:00 0.177 0.260 0.699 1.000 
2001-06-10 00:30:00 1.000 0.366 0.074 0.322 
2001-06-10 00:45:00 0 1.000 1.000 0.034 
2001-06-10 01:00:00 0.364 0 0 0 
 
The graph shown in Figure 14 shows how a single normalised dataset (consisting of 
both announcements and withdrawals) is carried over to the inputs for the 
autoencoder, in the means described above. 
4.3 Training the Autoencoder 
Once all datasets have been selected, the network is trained using the normal 
behaviour.  This was found by observation from the entire data period for June to 
September 2001, avoiding time intervals around the times when worms or major 
41 
physical events that affect Internet stability were known to occur.  Although more 
advanced techniques could be used to select this segment, the results proved similar 
regardless of the segment chosen (refer to section 6.5 for more information). 
4.4 Tests Performed 
The various parameters of the autoencoder were adjusted to determine the system’s 
sensitivity to changes in configuration.  Each parameter was varied to determine its 
individual effect on the system.  Once these values were adjusted, the overall results 
were examined.  The following parameters were tested for the neural network: 
· The number of inputs was varied between 10 and 160 inputs. 
· The number of hidden neurons was varied between 50 and 100. 
· The time interval was changed using values of one-, five- and fifteen minute 
intervals. 
The training data is also an important consideration for the neural network.  Various 
training regions have been tested, to find how the choice of training data affects the 
system. 
The primary goal for adjusting these parameters was for the autoencoder output to 
provide as distinct an indication of novelty as possible.  This means that the 
autoencoder output should be adjusted to either be near-zero (no novelty) or high 
(indicating significant novelty), providing a clear indication of whether there is an 
anomaly. 
The novelty value for each time interval is only useful as a relative measure of 
novelty, so the actual value is disregarded.  Therefore, a novelty value is only useful 
when compared to previous values.  In all cases the network was trained using the 
Scaled Conjugate Gradient optimisation technique.  For all tests, a hundred training 
cycles were used, ensuring that the network error was less than 10-14.  As described 
previously, the typical neural network concern of over-training is avoided when using 
an autoencoder. 
4.5 Software 
The raw data downloaded from the routers was extracted using the binary-to-ascii 
conversion provided by the MRT toolkit [42], which is written in the C programming 
language.  It proved to be easier to compile and execute this code in Linux, since this 
is the language in which the original libraries were written.  The code provided by the 
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MRT toolkit was modified to extract only the relevant BGP Update information, and 
an additional MySQL database plug-in for C was used to interface to the MySQL 
database [43] running on Linux. 
The data in the database was indexed based on the timestamps for the raw data, due 
to the large amount of data as well as the need to search based on the various time 
intervals.  Code was written and executed to rearrange the data into the various time 
intervals from June 2001 to September 2001, and rearranged into the structure 
required by the neural network. 
The database toolkit from Matlab v6.5 [44] was used to extract the various datasets 
from the database.  The Netlab toolkit [45] for Matlab was then used to train the 
autoencoder, and display the various results shown in the next section. 
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5 Results 
 
This section describes the results obtained from running the various tests using the 
autoencoder.  Based on the information presented in the literature, the important dates 
for global Internet instability in the selected time period were found and listed.  Also, 
the display of the various sets of data for the rrc0 router is shown in this chapter, 
which were used to train the neural network.  Several variables for the autoencoder 
have been adjusted to determine the most effective methods to use, and each 
subsection shows the results of the change.  The final results for the entire dataset are 
then presented.  This is followed by a comparison of the autoencoder to a rule-based 
system, which is one of the objectives of this research. 
5.1 Dates of Interest 
Data from the beginning of June 2001 to the end of September 2001 was used.  
Table 7 shows the dates of interest during this period in terms of Internet stability.  
The worm outbreak dates are when they were first detected, and there is an expected 
increase in autoencoder novelty around these dates.  From the literature, it was also 
expected that the novelty during the Baltimore Tunnel Train Wreck and World Trade 
Centre attacks would increase, but not to the same levels as the that caused by the 
worms more global and long lasting effects. 
The datasets used did not contain some values on 5 July 2001 from approximately 
17:15 to 19:09, which were treated as zero for both announcements and withdrawals.  
There is therefore an expected increase in novelty for this time period.  No reported 
global Internet instability could be found during June 2001. 
Table 7.  Dates of interest in terms of global Internet instability from June 2001 to September 
2001.  These dates include both worms and significant physical occurrences that affected the 
Internet. 
Date Description 
13 July 2001 Code-Red I v1 worm outbreak starts. 
18 July 2001 Baltimore Tunnel Train Wreck 
19 July 2001 Code-Red I v2 worm outbreak starts. 
4 August 2001 Code-Red II worm outbreak starts. 
11 September 2001 World Trade Centre Attacks 
18 September 2001 Nimda worm outbreak starts. 
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5.2 Extracted Data 
The graphs in Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the combined BGP Update messages 
from the rrc0 router.  Each point represents the number of BGP Update messages 
(announcements and withdrawals combined) in a fifteen-minute time interval.  The 
graph in Figure 16 shows the same information using a logarithmic axis.  This graph 
is similar to Figure 9 since it is for an overlapping time period and is from the same 
router.  The only difference is that the graph in Figure 9 used thirty-second time 
intervals per point.  All times for the data shown and used in this section are in 
GMT/UTC time, and are for the RIPE NCC router only. 
The graphs for the separate number of BGP announcements and withdrawals that 
make up the number of BGP Updates are shown in Appendix A. 
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Figure 15.  Linear representation of the total number of BGP Updates for all the datasets 
between June and September 2001.   These values were obtained from the rrc0 router data used 
for this project.  Each point represents the sum of the BGP Announcements and Withdrawals for 
a fifteen-minute time interval. 
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Figure 16.  Logarithmic representation of the total number of BGP Updates for all the datasets 
between June and September 2001.   These values were obtained from the rrc0 router data used 
for this project. 
 
The graphs in Figure 17 and Figure 18 are a magnified view of the previous graphs, 
showing the effect of the Code-Red I v1 worm on this router.  The number of BGP 
announcements reached a peak for the entire dataset from June to September 2001, 
with a total of 2,331,499 BGP announcement messages between 12:30 and 12:45 
GMT on 12 July 2001.  This is one day before the Code-Red I v1 worm was 
documented to have started. 
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Figure 17.  Linear representation of the total 
number of BGP Update messages around the 
time of the Code-Red I v1 worm.  The graph 
shows an increase in messages on 12 July 
2001. 
 Figure 18.  Logarithmic representation of the 
total number of BGP Update messages around 
the time of the Code-Red I v1 worm. 
 
The increase in BGP update messages caused by the Nimda worm can be seen in 
both Figure 19 and Figure 20.  There is a very sharp increase in the number of 
messages towards the end of the day on 18 September 2001.  Again the graphical 
values have been grouped into fifteen-minute time intervals.  The data peaks at 
1,163,145 announcement messages between 20:30 and 20:45 GMT.  The shape of the 
plot in Figure 20 corresponds to the previous data shown in Figure 11, with the only 
difference being the size of the time interval per point used. 
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Figure 19.  Linear representation of the total 
number of BGP Update messages from the 
extracted dataset during the Nimda worm. 
 Figure 20.  Logarithmic representation of the 
total number of BGP Update messages from 
the extracted dataset during the Nimda worm. 
5.3 Test Datasets 
Several sets of data were used to determine how sensitive the autoencoder is to 
changes in the dataset changes.  Based on the dates of interest, the autoencoder was 
trained during times where there were no reported worms or instances of Internet 
instability, and for which there was data available.  The entire month of June 2001 had 
no known issues, and provided a sufficiently long time period for testing the 
autoencoder. 
The autoencoder was trained with various combinations of the June 2001 data as 
training data.  The graph in Figure 21 shows the autoencoder novelty output plotted 
for the entire dataset, when trained using all of the June 2001 data.  The other 
autoencoder parameters are set to 100 inputs, 100 hidden neurons and each point 
represents the output for a fifteen-minute time period.  The graph in Figure 22 shows 
the output from a similar autoencoder, except that the training data was reduced to 
only use data between 2-9 June 2001.  The other system parameters were left 
unchanged.   
The graphs show very similar results and trends, with no notable changes between 
the results from the two datasets.  The autoencoder that used the whole of June’s input 
took longer to train, since there was approximately four times as much data.  When 
tested with various other training datasets, the system output showed minor changes in 
trends.  These differences did not change the overall spikes of the system in any 
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discernable way.  The training data for 2-9 June 2001 was therefore selected from 
these results for the remainder of the tests. 
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Figure 21.  Autoencoder novelty values when using the entire June 2001 dataset for training.  
Each point represents the novelty output for a fifteen-minute time interval. 
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Figure 22.  Autoencoder novelty values when using the first eight days of data from 2 June 2001 
to 9 June 2001 for training as the training dataset.  This graph shows similar trends and spikes to 
the previous graph. 
5.4 Number of Input-Output Pairs 
The number of input-output pairs was varied to determine the optimal amount of 
historical data to provide to the system.  By increasing the number of inputs, more 
data from previous time intervals are introduced to the system.  It was found that by 
increasing the number of inputs, and therefore increasing the length of time that a 
single time interval will be used in the set of inputs, the novelty values continued to be 
affected in subsequent time periods.  An indication of this effect was evident when a 
high number of announcements or withdrawals occurred.  The raised values caused an 
increase in novelty as soon as large values were included in the dataset, and the 
novelty remained high for as long as these values were included in the subsequent 
datasets.   
An example of this effect was during the Code-Red I v1 worm, which had a very 
large novelty value when the high normalised input was included, as well as for the 
subsequent time intervals for which it was included.  The graphs in Figure 23 and 
Figure 24 show the effect of the number inputs using extreme values of 10 and 160 
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inputs respectively, at the time at which Code-Red I v1 appeared.  The large spike 
from the former graph quickly decreases in size after a few intervals when the high 
input is no longer included in the dataset.  The latter graph has a much longer increase 
in novelty, since this high input remains present in more of the subsequent datasets.  It 
is evident that the raised number of historical inputs used lengthens the time that the 
novelty values are increased. 
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Figure 23.  Novelty output for Code-Red I v1 using only ten inputs (five for BGP announcements 
and five for BGP withdrawals).  The graph shows how the low number of inputs decreases the 
number of time intervals that the system is affected by a single high input. 
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Figure 24.  Novelty output for Code-Red I v1 with 160 inputs (80 for BGP announcements and 80 
for BGP withdrawals).  The trend on this graph shows the opposite effect to the previous graph, 
which is for the same time period.  A single high input now affects the novelty for a longer period 
of time due to the lengthened time that the high value is present in subsequent datasets. 
 
It is also evident from these figures that the number of inputs also affects the 
system’s ability to learn from historical data.  When very few inputs are used, the 
system is only able to respond to these inputs.  In the extreme case with only one 
announcement and withdrawal input, the behaviour becomes similar to a rule-based 
system.  But the trade-off is that by increasing the number of inputs, it takes longer to 
train and execute, and would require more computation for a real system. 
There was a concern that by increasing the number of inputs, the effect of a single 
high value in the dataset would be dampened.  If this were the case, then the 
autoencoder would respond slower to high inputs, and make the system less effective.  
This is discussed in section 5.8, which shows that this is not the case. 
An optimal value of fifty announcements and withdrawal inputs was selected as a 
sufficient compromise between the training speed and the need for using the historical 
data.  The other system parameters used were left unchanged from the previous 
section. 
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5.5 Hidden Neurons 
In the literature, previous research has recommended using fewer hidden neurons 
than inputs.  This ensures that the system adequately compresses the data, and does 
not become too closely linked to the training data.  The autoencoder was therefore 
trained using 50, 75 and 100 hidden neurons.  The graphs for 50 and 75 neurons are 
shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26  respectively.  The graph for 100 neurons is shown 
previously in Figure 22. 
As with the choice of training data, the output was not markedly affected by 
different numbers of hidden neurons.  It was seen that reducing the hidden neurons 
caused slightly more erratic behaviour when a high input was presented.  For this 
reason, the value was selected to be the upper limit of using the same number of 
hidden neurons as inputs (in this case 100 hidden neurons).  The disadvantage is that 
more neurons require a longer time to train and run the autoencoder. 
The other system parameters were left unchanged from the previous section.  
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Figure 25.  Novelty for entire dataset using 50 hidden neurons.  The autoencoder has less memory 
when the number of hidden neurons is low, and so tends to respond more erratically when high 
input values are used. 
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Figure 26.  Novelty for entire dataset using 75 hidden neurons.  The higher number of hidden 
neurons adds more stability to the output.  This is evident from the lower novelty values tending 
to be relatively closer to zero compared to the previous graph.  This effect is marginal, and for 
the ranges tested does not fundamentally change the output trend. 
5.6 Time Interval Size 
The selection of the time interval size to group the number of BGP announcements 
and withdrawals used is the most important factor in detecting a worm earlier on.  The 
system is only able to give a novelty once the number of BGP Updates for the current 
time period is known.  A system configured using one-minute time intervals is able to 
detect a worm fourteen minutes ahead of a system using fifteen-minute intervals.  The 
disadvantage of using shorter time periods is that the number of datasets increases, as 
well as the time taken to train the system.  The computer memory requirements also 
increase dramatically, since fifteen times more memory is required in this example for 
the training and full datasets.  The time to load, train and display the results was much 
longer for the one-minute time interval than for the longer time intervals. 
The graphs in Figure 27 and Figure 28 show the results for one- and five-minute 
time intervals.  The representation of the fifteen-minute time interval is shown in 
Figure 22.  The configuration parameters for the neural network have been left 
unchanged, using the values selected from the previous sections.  It is clear from the 
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shorter time interval graphs that the novelty spikes for anomalies are relatively larger 
than the spikes for the longer time intervals.  This is beneficial, since it allows for a 
clearer indication of a problem. 
From these results, it is evident that novelty spikes for the fifteen-minute time 
interval graph are also reflected in the shorter five- and one-minute time intervals.  No 
information is lost when reducing the time intervals.  For these reasons, the one-
minute time period was used for the rest of the analysis. 
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Figure 27.  Novelty output using five-minute time intervals for grouping the number of BGP 
announcements and withdrawals.  The neural network was configured with 100 input-output 
pairs and 100 hidden neurons.  The peaks are more pronounced than for the fifteen-minute time 
interval neural networks. 
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Figure 28.  Novelty output using one-minute time intervals.  The autoencoder was trained using 
100 input-output pairs.  The novelty spikes are more evident than for the five- and fifteen-minute 
time intervals. 
5.7 Final Results 
The previous sections demonstrated the selection of each neural network parameter 
to provide the best indication of novelty.  From these results, a final trained network 
was configured, using the following parameters: 
· 100 input-output pairs (50 BGP announcements and 50 BGP withdrawals) 
· 100 hidden neurons 
· 1 minute time intervals 
The resultant autoencoder novelty for the entire time period between June and 
September 2001 is shown in Figure 29.  Each of the significant events is shown on the 
graph, and is discussed in section 6.1.  These events show both local and global 
anomalies.  This graph represents the effectiveness of the method proposed in this 
study for determining the presence of global instability, especially in the presence of 
worms.  It also forms the basis of most of the discussion in the following chapter. 
A horizontal threshold line has been added to the graph.  Any novelty values above 
this threshold indicate a warning that there may be global Internet instability caused 
56 
by a worm.  The height of the threshold has been chosen to include some of the 
highest peaks, specifically that of the Nimda worm.  The choice of this threshold is 
also discussed in the next chapter. 
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Figure 29.  Novelty values from the final trained autoencoder for the entire dataset from June to September 2001.  The network has been trained using 100 input-
output pairs, 100 hidden neurons and the time interval for each point is one minute.  A horizontal novelty threshold has been manually inserted.  
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5.8 Rule-Based Comparison 
A rule-based prediction system is a simpler alternative to the autoencoder proposed 
in this project.  Instead of using a neural network, the rule-based system would 
directly use the BGP Update data to provide warnings of instability.  This section 
shows the results of a comparison of the two possible prediction methods.  A basic 
rule-based system is proposed, which generates warnings when the total number of 
BGP Updates exceeds a pre-specified threshold. 
The following table lists the highest number of BGP Updates, which would most 
likely be the cause of an alarm being triggered for a rule-based system.  The data is 
the number of BGP Updates, taken from the same source in the database as for the 
autoencoder.  The highest available granularity of one-minute time intervals was used.  
The values represent the fifteen highest BGP Updates for the entire dataset from June 
to September 2001, and are ordered from highest to lowest number of BGP Updates.  
The Event column indicates which physical or worm event most likely caused the 
peak (refer to section 5.1 for the full list of significant events).  Any localised router 
events seen in the autoencoder are also correlated. 
Similar to the autoencoder, the rule-based system would also require a threshold for 
the number of BGP Updates that would trigger an alarm, but since only fifteen values 
have been listed in the table, each of these values would most likely be above the 
threshold and cause an alarm to be triggered.  It is interesting to note that the table 
does not include an event for the Nimda worm, which had a peak of 293,079 
messages at 2001-09-18 18:01.  As explained in the literature, significant damage was 
caused by Nimda, and was therefore expected to feature in the table.  In order for this 
rule-based system to have generated a warning for Nimda, the threshold would have 
had to be set to include the top 25 peaks.  By comparison, the autoencoder shows only 
twelve groups of data that exceed the threshold for the entire dataset (seven of which 
are caused by the extended effects of the Code-Red II worm). 
From the table it can be seen that this rule-based system would be able to detect 
instability caused by global effects such as worms, as well as localised problems that 
were also shown by the autoencoder.  But, two of the highest values were not caused 
by any known event, and would trigger false-alarms. 
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Table 8.  Highest number of BGP Updates for the entire dataset from June to September 2001.  
The time buckets are grouped into one-minute intervals, and the significant events noted. 
No. Time 
(1min interval) 
Number of 
BGP Updates 
Event 
1 2001-07-27 14:50:00 595001 Localised II (also seen with autoencoder). 
2 2001-08-02 13:30:00 592458 Code-Red II 
3 2001-08-17 20:57:00 572124 Code-Red II (extended effect) 
4 2001-08-18 20:39:00 556038 Code-Red II (extended effect) 
5 2001-07-12 12:42:00 541756 Code-Red I v1 
6 2001-08-03 11:24:00 534271 Code-Red II 
7 2001-08-20 20:44:00 526423 Code-Red II (extended effect) 
8 2001-06-10 17:35:00 504463 Localised I (also seen with autoencoder). 
9 2001-08-06 23:03:00 499349 Code-Red II 
10 2001-06-10 17:36:00 486930 Localised I 
11 2001-07-12 12:39:00 475865 Code-Red I v1 
12 2001-07-12 12:38:00 453161 Code-Red I v1 
13 2001-08-10 16:32:00 436326 Code-Red II (extended effect) 
14 2001-08-10 16:33:00 432627 Code-Red II (extended effect) 
15 2001-08-20 20:43:00 418252 Code-Red II (extended effect) 
 
The next two graphs show the comparison of how quickly the rule-based and 
autoencoder systems would trigger an alarm due to the Code-Red I v1 and Nimda 
worms.  The graph in Figure 30 shows the autoencoder novelty around the time of the 
Code-Red I v1 worm.  The grid-line indicates the time that the rule-based system 
would trigger an alarm, based on the peak number of BGP Updates shown in the 
previous table.  This grid-line corresponds to the time 2001-07-12 12:38, which was 
ranked 12th in the table.  The 5th and 11th values occurred in the following two 
minutes, and would also generate alarms, but this was the earliest time that the rule-
based system would have triggered an alarm.  It is evident from the graph that the 
autoencoder would trigger an alarm at roughly the same time as the rule-based 
system.  
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Figure 30.  Comparison between autoencoder and rule-based system for Code-Red I v1.  The 
graph shows the autoencoder output, and the grid line indicates the point at which the rule-based 
system would trigger an alarm. 
 
The graph in Figure 31 shows the same type of information for the period the 
Nimda worm occurred.  The grid-line shows when the rule-based system would 
trigger an alarm based on the highest number of BGP Updates at this time 
(corresponding to the 25th highest number of BGP Updates).  It is interesting to note 
that in this case the autoencoder is able to generate an alarm more than an hour earlier 
than the rule-based system. 
Rule-Based System Alarm 
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Figure 31.  Comparison between autoencoder and rule-based system for Nimda.  The graph 
shows the autoencoder output, and the grid line indicates the point at which the rule-based 
system would trigger an alarm. 
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6 Discussion 
 
The following sections review the results from the previous chapter.  Several of the 
key points and observations are discussed, followed by an analysis of the objectives of 
the project. 
6.1 Output Interpretation 
This section discusses the final results obtained in section 5.7.  The novelty values 
from Figure 29 shows several spikes that exceed the threshold.  Each of these spikes 
as well as the dates of interest are discussed below: 
· The first spike, Localised I, occurs during June 2001, which is not known to 
contain any global Internet instability.  The data contains higher normalised 
values for the number of announcements and withdrawals at this time 
(reaching a peak of 504,463 BGP Updates in a one-minute time interval), 
which caused the high novelty values.  The origin of the higher number of 
BGP Updates is suspected to be due to a localised problem.  This is most 
likely due to an incorrectly configured router that is within the 
neighbourhood of the rrc0 router.   Another possibility is that BGP route 
flap damping has not been deployed on several neighbouring routers, and a 
local problem on one of the routers has caused route flapping in this 
localised area of the Internet. 
· The second spike, Zero Values, is caused by the missing BGP Update data 
on 5 July 2001.  The novelty value was expected to increase because of the 
zero number of announcements and withdrawals at this time, as mentioned 
in section 5.2.  This spike does not reach the threshold, and would not raise 
an alarm. 
· The third spike is caused by Code-Red I v1, which had a marked effect on 
global Internet instability, and was expected to cause a high novelty value.  
This had the highest number of announcement messages within the dataset, 
as well as the highest novelty caused by this.  The spike clearly indicates a 
potential worm, and would generate an alarm. 
· The Baltimore Train Tunnel Wreck showed a very small increase in novelty 
from the autoencoder.  The novelty was far below the threshold which was 
not unexpected.  This was a localised problem in another part of the Internet 
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that caused a brief burst of BGP Updates, after which the routing converged.  
The BGP protocol is able deal with this type of route change, which does not 
cause BGP route flapping or extended periods of high load. 
· The Code-Red I v2 worm which occurred on 19 July 2001 showed a small 
increase in novelty, caused by a slight increase in the number of BGP 
announcements and withdrawals.  The value was far below the threshold, 
and would not be considered a threat to stability.  From the literature, it was 
found that this worm was almost programmatically identical to the Code-
Red I v1 worm, with one of the only difference being an improvement to the 
list of IP addresses used to attack other hosts.  The worm was 
programmatically designed to stop spreading on the 20th day of the month 
(approximately a day after the worm first appeared), which seems to have 
severely limited the impact of the worm.  The low novelty during this time is 
therefore not surprising. 
· The next spike, Localised II, is again a high novelty value during a time 
when no large worms are known to occur.  This is again suspected to be due 
to local instability in the neighbourhood of the rrc0 router. 
· The next spike occurred at the beginning of August 2001, and was caused by 
the appearance of Code-Red II.  This worm had a more devastating effect 
than Code-Red I in terms of economic impact, but had a slightly lower 
novelty spike for the autoencoder.  The peak is still well above the specified 
threshold, and can be regarded as a threat to stability.  The novelty values 
throughout August remain high and this series of spike are most likely due to 
the long-lasting effects of the worm.  The literature also noted that the two 
strains of Code-Red I were also still active and causing instability.  As 
discussed in the section 2.3.2.1, these worms actively spread between the 1st 
and 20th of the month.  The research also indicated that 32% of Code-Red I 
infected hosts had not been patched by the 1st of August, when the worm 
restarted its propagation phase.  It therefore seems reasonable for the various 
Code-Red I strains to have caused some of these spikes, since the last of the 
spikes during August 2001 ended on about the 20th day of the month. 
· The spike caused by the World Trade Centre Attacks on September 11th 
2001 does not meet the threshold.  Similar to the Baltimore Tunnel Train 
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Wreck, this spike is due to the sudden increase in BGP Updates which 
allows the network to readjust and find alternative routes.  Once this has 
stabilised, the number of BGP routing messages returns to normal. 
· The last two spikes are caused by the Nimda worm during September 2001.  
The peak is surprisingly low, considering the devastating effect that Nimda 
had on the Internet as a whole.  But the spike is still considerable and would 
trigger an alarm. 
From this discussion, it was shown that an autoencoder trained with the BGP 
Update data is able to correctly identify the presence of worms.  The suspected 
localised effects are also detected by the autoencoder, which would also generate 
alarms.  This may be useful for detecting any sort of instability, but would be a false 
alarm if the system were only used to detect worms. 
6.2 BGP Behaviour 
This section discusses the behaviour of BGP in the presence of a worm compared 
with localised outages such as the World Trade Centre Attacks. 
The prolonged increase in load caused by worms’ causes high latency times 
between routers.  If the BGP Keep-Alive messages sent between routers are not 
received timeously because of these delays or router failures, the BGP sessions 
between the routers are closed.  The routers then inform the surrounding routers of the 
change in routers using BGP announcements.  Once routers are able to communicate, 
they attempt to re-establish sessions, which causes BGP withdrawal messages to be 
sent.  This effect continues until human countermeasures are put into place, or until 
the worms stop spreading because of their programmed behaviour.  The high number 
of BGP messages was evident from the spikes seen in the results. 
The localised effects seen from the analysis differ in behaviour to the worms, but 
both caused increases in the autoencoder output.  The effects of Localised I and 
Localised II are assumed to be caused by routing problems in the vicinity of the rrc0 
router.  The novelty values are large during these times, and comparable to the effect 
of worms.  This can be accounted for by the global Internet instability causing 
localised instability throughout the Internet.  This implies that the autoencoder treats 
global and localised instabilities in the same way. 
The effect of localised instabilities on the number of BGP Updates is less 
pronounced when originating from disparate areas of the Internet.  This was evident in 
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the results for the spikes caused by the World Trade Centre Attacks and the Baltimore 
Tunnel Train Wreck, neither of which would have caused an alarm.  The routers in the 
neighbourhood of these occurrences would have showed considerably higher novelty 
values than were seen at the rrc0 router. 
The localised problems do increase the number of BGP updates, but the high level 
of redundancy for Internet routes allows autonomous systems to connect via many 
routes.  These events don’t cause overall Internet instability, and any prolonged 
outage caused will likely be at a few endpoints which have had their only available 
routes disconnected. 
The results also showed several cases of an increase in the number of BGP Updates 
prior to the time of the worm being reported in the literature.  This was evident from 
Code-Red I, which was only documented to have started on the following day.  The 
autoencoder correspondingly showed a peak earlier than documented, showing that 
the BGP impact occurred earlier than the instability noticed by humans.  This further 
justifies the use of BGP information to detect instability. 
6.3 Single Router Data 
It has been determined that the global Internet instability caused by worms can be 
detected by monitoring a single router.  This is important since the creation of an 
advanced warning system would require live data to be processed.  If the data were 
not received timeously then the system would be less effective, since it would have to 
wait for the data before calculating the novelty.  If this type of system is installed at a 
single router, there would be no problem with gathering a single set of data.  If more 
than one router were required, it would be necessary to collate the data from these 
routers.  This would involve transmitting data from scattered Internet routers to a 
central place, with the transmission medium most likely to be the Internet itself.  
Since the instability caused by the worm could delay or stop the reception of these 
messages, a system requiring more than one router could prove ineffective at the time 
that it is most required to detect a worm.  Even in the event that the data could be 
transmitted within a guaranteed time, the system would still be required to wait for 
values from all the routers. 
The results have shown that any localised problems at the router also produce spikes 
at the output of the autoencoder, which cannot be distinguished from novelty spikes 
caused by worms.  This effect would mostly be resolved by using data from routers in 
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disparate areas of the Internet.  Localised effects in one area will not markedly affect a 
separate area of the Internet, whereas the increase caused by the worm would be 
global across all routers.  By combining this data, it would be apparent which spikes 
are caused by global instability, and which are local. 
6.4 Threshold 
In order to determine if a novelty spike is a threat, it is necessary to set a threshold.  
Any spikes above this threshold should indicate a potential problem, while values 
below this can be ignored.  Methods for setting a threshold were beyond the scope of 
this study.  The threshold for Figure 29 was chosen based on the selection of a value 
which would include only a few spikes across the entire data range.  A method for 
setting this threshold could be done in several ways, such as manual adjustment based 
on previous data (similar to that used here), or using a trained learning algorithm.  
Further investigations into threshold assignments are required to resolve this issue. 
6.5 Autoencoder Effectiveness 
The autoencoder was not particularly sensitive to changes in the various system 
parameters, such as the number of hidden units and input-output pairs.  The 
implication of this is that the system responds in a similar manner for a wide range of 
parameters, making the choice of parameters a straightforward matter that is unlikely 
to affect the systems overall performance.  The selection of the training region had a 
more pronounced impact, but the novelty outputs were high for the significant events 
even when the autoencoder had been trained to include the events.  This demonstrates 
the autoencoder’s ability to perform PCA as well as data compression.  This level of 
tolerance would be very useful in a real-world system, since the system could be 
trained easily and be less dependant on tweaking. 
The choice of a training region is common across all types of neural networks.  In 
the case of a neural network classifier, it would be necessary to break the data into 
“normal” and “worm” categories.  The autoencoder is instead able to intrinsically 
determine novel data. 
The autoencoder required very little information about the system, from which it 
was able to provide reasonably accurate results.  That the system was able to identify 
the worms is interesting, since none of the training data included any data about 
worms.  This demonstrates that the system was not biased toward any type of worm, 
and should be able to respond to new types of worms in a similar manner.  This is 
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very important in the case of worms, since their means of propagation and infection 
are vastly different and continuously changing. 
Another advantage of the autoencoder is that it was able to respond to a high 
number of BGP announcements or withdrawals quickly.  This was shown in the 
comparison to the rule-based system in the results (see section 5.8), where the 
autoencoder provided a high novelty at the same time or sooner than the peak number 
of announcements.  This demonstrates the autoencoder’s ability to detect underlying 
trends in the data. 
6.6 Meeting of Objectives 
The following subsections discuss the results with respect to each of the objectives 
for this project. 
6.6.1 Autoencoder to provide a measure of instability 
Objective: To use the novelty detection of a trained autoencoder to provide an 
indication of the possibility of Internet instability, specifically that of worms. 
The autoencoder was shown to be able to detect instability, both localised and 
global.  The Internet-wide instability was seen to be caused by worms.  Events such as 
the World Trade Centre attacks did not feature to the same degree as for worms within 
the studied time period.  The autoencoder required no worm data for training, 
ensuring that it would be able to detect new and different types of worms that cause 
Internet instability.  The autoencoder was easy to train, and was able to determine the 
underlying system parameters from the data.  It was also resilient to changes in the 
number of inputs, hidden neurons and the training data used, providing a high level of 
confidence in the novelty output values, without much concern that the configuration 
may be incorrect. 
6.6.2 Novelty Detection vs. Rule-Based System 
Objective: To determine if novelty detection using an autoencoder is able to predict 
Internet-wide instability sooner than a rule-based system.   
It was shown that a simple rule-based system is able to detect many of the worms 
and localised events that the autoencoder was able to detect.  Both the rule-based and 
autoencoder systems required a threshold to be set, which affected the number of 
alarms generated by each system.  The autoencoder was shown to generate fewer 
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alarms for a similarly tested threshold, while still detecting the most important 
anomalies. 
The autoencoder is able to use both current and previous data, from which it can 
determine novelty using trends in the data.  The rule-based system is always reliant on 
the current data point, making it more susceptible to outlying points.  In the cases of 
the Code-Red I v1 and Nimda worms, the autoencoder was able to respond either as 
fast as or faster than the simple rule-based system. 
From the results, it can be seen that the trained autoencoder performs better than the 
simple rule-based system.  A more accurate rule-based system will likely require more 
configuration parameters to be effective.  A rule-based system does not have the 
ability to learn as in the case of the autoencoder, and would instead require that a 
network administrator adjust the system’s behaviour using complex parameters.  
Although the autoencoder requires more computational power than a rule-based 
system, much of the complexity could be hidden from the administrator of such a 
system. 
6.6.3 BGP Update Messages as Only Input 
Objective:  To determine if using the BGP Update messages alone as input to the 
autoencoder is sufficient to predict instability. 
Although the autoencoder was able to determine a lot of the underlying information 
about the data, additional information could provide better results.  The exact 
parameters that should be used can be debated, but additional routing information is 
already available in the data that was downloaded for this project.  Non-routing 
information, such as a measure of the traffic load at any point would potentially be 
useful.  This data is not as easily available, especially when analysing data from 
previous years and routers, as in the case for this project. 
6.6.4 Single Router 
Objective: To determine if a single router can effectively represent Internet-wide 
instability. 
It was seen that a single router is able to show global Internet instability, but also 
includes any localised routing problems as well.  These localised problems cause 
novelty spikes from the autoencoder, and cannot be distinguished from global 
instability.  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, collating the data from multiple 
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disparate routers may solve this problem, since only global instability would be 
evident from the results of multiple routers. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
Worms cause billions of dollars of damage yearly.  Each new worm is designed to 
take advantage of new vulnerabilities; hence their signatures are vastly different.  This 
project selected the common impact of these worms to use for input data to the 
autoencoder, to make the system able to respond to one of the side-effects of the 
worms spread – their effect on routing.  Specifically, the BGP Update messages which 
increase in number in the presence of a worm on other Internet instability caused have 
provided a convincing input to the autoencoder. 
The work performed in this project demonstrated that a trained neural network is 
able to detect both global and localised instability at a single router.  The main focus 
was to detect global Internet instability caused by worms, for which the autoencoder 
was able to correctly show anomalies.  The autoencoder is not able to distinguish 
between a global instability such as in the case of the worm, and a localised event that 
is in the vicinity of the router.  Any world-wide event that affects Internet stability, 
such as the World Trade Centre Attacks, would not trigger an alarm from the output 
of the autoencoder, unless it is in the neighbourhood of the router being monitored.  
This work is the first known application of a neural network to predict Internet 
instability using BGP routing information. 
The autoencoder was shown to be easy to train, and the selection of each neural 
network parameter and training data did not fundamentally change the output novelty 
for the system.  The autoencoder was trained using only normal data, which makes it 
easier to train than a neural network classifier.  It was able to detect anomalies such as 
worms without prior knowledge of the worm data, which makes it flexible for 
detecting new worms with different signatures. 
A threshold was added to the autoencoder output, to indicate whether the novelty 
value indicates a threat to stability.  For this project, the level was chosen by looking 
at the whole dataset, and choosing a value that would include the most significant 
spikes.  The selection of this threshold was not analysed in detail, and could be 
improved in further work. 
A comparison was performed between the output from the autoencoder and a simple 
rule-based system.  From the results of this comparison, it was evident that both 
systems were able to detect both global and localised instability.   The autoencoder 
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was able to use current as well as previous data to provide the novelty, which allowed 
it to respond at either the same speed or faster than the basic rule-based system.   The 
neural network was also less sensitive to outlier points, since it had the ability to use 
previous data and to recognise trends in the data.  The autoencoder is more complex 
internally than the rule-based system, but a rule-based system would require far more 
configuration changes for a network administrator to achieve similar performance to 
that of the autoencoder. 
It is possible that additional inputs such as traffic load could improve the data.  By 
correlating the output from disparate routers of the Internet, the localised effect seen 
on the routers could be eliminated, leaving only the global Internet instabilities.  The 
problems associated with using more than one router were discussed.  The most 
significant concern was that the transporting of the data between routers would most 
likely be via the Internet, which would cause a delay in the detection of global 
Internet instability. 
A system based on the results of this project would not eliminate the threat of 
worms, since the prediction made by the neural network relies on the effects of a 
worm already circulating on the Internet, but it will provide forewarning of a potential 
attack.  This in turn will allow for earlier analysis of the vulnerability exploited, 
making patches available sooner and alerting uninfected network administrators about 
the threat.  In these cases the damage will be reduced, with a large saving in time for 
the Internet community. 
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8 Further Work 
 
A true measure of the performance of this method would be to run the autoencoder 
on live data.  This would demonstrate whether the autoencoder is able to detect new 
forms of worms that haven’t been seen before.  Another advantage of live testing 
would be to demonstrate a real worm prediction system prototype.  An extension to 
this would be to retrain the network on the fly, allowing the autoencoder to adapt to 
the behaviour of new worms. 
It is believed that the greatest improvement could be made by using additional 
inputs to the autoencoder.  It is suggested that only inputs that are available from a 
single router be used, so that the solution would be practical for a real 
implementation.  One input could be the number of unique routes that have been 
updated within the current time-period, which will provide more information as to 
how many individual routes are being affected at the current time.  A low value of 
unique routes but with a high number of BGP Updates would most likely indicate 
instability of only a few routes, which is unlikely to be as a result of a worm.  Another 
possible input would be the number of packets flowing through the router for the 
specified time interval.  This would provide some information to the autoencoder that 
is not directly BGP based. 
Another validation of this technique would be to use data from other routers.  The 
router chosen for this project has been used in several studies that provided the basis 
for this work, so the choice of other routers could provide a broader verification of the 
results obtained here.  It would also then be possible to compare the novelty of an 
edge router with that of a core Internet router.  This would demonstrate if a core router 
is able to detect a worm earlier to a smaller router.  
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Appendix A: BGP Announcements and Withdrawals 
 
The following graphs show the number of BGP announcement and BGP withdrawal 
messages individually for the dates from June to September 2001.  The total number 
of BGP Update messages, which is the sum of the announcements and withdrawals, 
has been displayed in the main text.  The number of BGP Update messages (plotted 
linearly in Figure 32 and logarithmically in Figure 33) closely follows that of the 
announcements, which is expected since the announcements dominate the results.  
Each point represents the number of BGP Updates during a fifteen-minute time 
period.  The graphs in Figure 34 and Figure 35 similarly show the total number of 
BGP withdrawal messages for the same time period. 
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Figure 32.  Linear representation of the total number of BGP Announcement messages between 
June and September 2001. 
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Figure 33.  Logarithmic representation of the total number of BGP Announcement messages 
between June and September 2001. 
2001-06-02 2001-07-01 2001-08-01 2001-09-01 2001-10-01
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
x 10
6
Date (UCT/GMT)
No
. o
f W
ith
dr
aw
al
s
 
Figure 34.  Linear representation of the total number of BGP Withdrawal messages between 
June and September 2001. 
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Figure 35.  Logarithmic representation of the total number of BGP Withdrawal messages 
between June and September 2001. 
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Appendix B: Paper Submitted to PRASA 
 
The following paper was submitted to the Pattern Recognition Association of South 
Africa (PRASA) and accepted for presentation in November 2004.  The conference 
was held in Grabouw, South Africa.  The paper appeared in pages 81-86 of the 
conference proceedings. 
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